한국일본학회

This paper investigates the decisions and processes that the figures of the New Government, especially Okubo Toshimichi, had to make and go through to make a former Shogun Yoshinobu's pardon(executed on Sept. 28 of Meiji 2) possible. At the time when competent public officers from the Tokugawa shogunate was needed for the success of the New Government, Okubo made efforts to invite Katsu Kaishuu to the post of the Gaimu-tajo. Okubo, however, was indirectly notified of Katsu's unwillingness to join the cabinet unless Yoshinobu was pardoned beforehand, and the New Government, which was reluctant to pardon Yoshinobu, had to mull over the issue of lifting his disciplinary confinement. In this process, it was Okubo who showed the most positive attitude to the former Shogun's pardon among the government figures. Knowing that Yoshinobu's pardon was not realized because of Sanjo's opposition at the end of the previous year, Okubo actively searched for a political solution that could overcome a grim reality of the confrontation and rivalry between the Satsuma and the Choshu. He proposed “The Future Grand Purpose Theory” and “Tenno Shindanron” as post-war doctrines for settling the nation's post-war issues after the Boshin War. The purpose of his doctrines was to seek to firmly establish the goals of the New Government in the face of severe domestic conflicts and chaos, and to leave the pending decisions on complex post-war issues to the emperor. But the plan to execute Yoshinobu's pardon with the emperor's permission and generosity was postponed due to an unexpected political situation. Especially Sanjo's objection to the plan was an obstacle and Okubo was furious about it. But Iwakura, who was close to Okubo, suggested a compromising proposal and helped Yoshinobu's pardon, at the risk of being postponed again, to be executed. This means that Yoshinobu's pardon was carried out in the form of an imperial rescript based on the emperor's decision, as Okubo wished.